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Abstract-Drawing on literatures documenting the experience of physicians in both European and 
American societies, a new theoretical framework for explaining variations in the professional power of 
physicians is provided. Most studies of professions have used professional organization as the principal 
explanatory variable, with state policy and the organization of civil society as secondary mediating factors. 
Our approach instead treats strategies of state power and forms of civil society as central features shaping 
the ability of the profession to exert power. Such a three-dimensional approach not only allows us to make 
more powerful classifications explaining contemporary differences, but also allows us to trace historical 
shifts and anticipate alternative futures in professional power. For example, in those societies where the 
state’s intervention is limited and civil society is pluralistic, professional power is potentially greatest. But 
increasing state power does not necessarily reduce professional power. Where the state is most powerful 
and organizes all groups in civil society, professionals and society can be united in common struggle 
against the state. In response to that, it is likely that such centralized states will opt for corporatist 
solutions to maximize the internal differentiation of society and pit those once allied against one another, 
and preclude the oganization of powerful autonomous interest groups. 
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How is the professional power* of physicians devel- 
oped in different kinds of societies? Are the forms 
taken to limit or to augment professional power 
different in societies with contrasting political econ- 
omies, as in state capitalist Mexico and state socialist 
Poland? Or is professional power being limited every- 
where as a consequence of some general evolutionary 
trend? 
Frenk and Donabedian suggest that state inter- 
vention in health care has increased over time, 
although along different paths for western industrial- 
ized countries, socialist countries and the non-social- 
ist underdeveloped countries. Nonetheless, all forms 
converge on a model of considerable state control 
over medical care because of modernization, the 
emergence of a world economy, and the establish- 
ment of a world polity [2]. But against this general 
convergence theory, the professional power of phys- 
icians remains uneven, providing evidence of the 
intrinsic problems of the general model of conver- 
gence we see elsewhere. 
*Professional power is the capacity of a highly educated 
group to (a) control the conditions of its occupational 
practice and reproduction; and (b) reshape other insti- 
tutions, particularly of distribution, in its own collective 
interest [I]. 
Korporatist representation is understood by Frenk and 
Donabedian [2, p. 281 as “a system of interest represen- 
tation characterized by hierarchical and non-competitive 
occupational associations, which represent their mem- 
bers’ interests through direct negotiations with the 
state”. 
However, Frenk and Donabedian find systemic 
roots for this variation [2,2&29]. Physicians’ greatest 
power is in societies where physicians are represented 
in a corporatist fashion and others are not, as in the 
U.S.A.? They are moderately powerful when both 
physicians and other groups are so organized, as in 
Sweden; moderately weak when the professional 
association is shared with other non-medical health 
care workers and no one else is organized in a 
corporate fashion, as in the U.S.S.R.; and very weak 
when others are corporatively organized and phys- 
icians are not, as in Mexico. This results in a neat two 
by two table (see Table 1). 
According to these authors, this table clarifies the 
foundation for the professional power of physicians: 
it depends on the oganization of physicians them- 
selves as well as the organization of the other groups 
with which they deal (see also Refs [3-S]). Paradoxi- 
cally, although the bulk of Frenk and Donabedian’s 
analysis of health care is based on state intervention, 
the effect of state power is left out of their account of 
professional power. ‘Can’t the state itself play a 
variable role, augmenting, restricting or redirecting 
professional power in medicine?’ We argue that state 
power is central in the analysis of professional power. 
The elaboration of that thesis is the aim of the present 
essay. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
One might improve Frenk and Donabedian’s two 
by two table by introducing two major aspects. First, 
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Table I. Professional power and corporate oraanization cross-nationally 
Reorcsentarion of ohvsicians 
Representation of other groups 
COrp Noncorp 
Non-carp Very powerful (U.S.A.) Moderately weak (U.S.S.R.) 
COT Moderately powerful (Sweden) Weak (Mexico) 
Source: Frenk and Donabedian, 1987, p. 29. 
introducing the consideration of state strength, and 
secondly, by incorporating the strategies followed by 
the state to deal with civil society. 
State power 
It is tempting to say that when the state controls 
more spheres of social life, the state is more powerful. 
But the capacity to control is not the same as the 
capacity to structure outcomes. There is a potential 
disjuncture between the resources of the state and the 
state’s capacity to realize aims. Pierre Birnbaum 
argues, for instance, that strong states (characterized 
by high levels of institutionalization, differentiation 
and autonomy) are unable, as are weak states, to 
form corporatist systems [6]. Only where states are 
moderately strong can corporatist strategies be im- 
plemented. State resources, therefore, do not guaran- 
tee that the state can structure outcomes. Nor 
does state power, in terms either of its resources 
or its steering capacity, necessarily translate across 
sectors. 
Capacities to intervene in foreign affairs and differ- 
ent capacities to intervene and structure outcomes in 
different areas of the domestic arena are not perfectly 
correlated [A. Even the repressive power of the state 
and its commitment to organizing domestic activities 
is not always highly associated. For example, the 
Chilean ‘program of libertarianism from above’ was 
predicated on the basis of a ‘small-state, strong-state’ 
project in which the coercive power of the state grew 
as it tried to privatize formerly state functions [8]. 
Evans, Skocpol and Rueschemeyer recommend, 
therefore, that some “overall level of generalized 
capacity or ‘state strength’ cannot be used to explain 
the possibilities for successful state intervention” [9, 
p. 3531. They do argue, however, that certain basic 
capacities might structure opportunities for state 
actions. The scope of state intervention in its 
domestic affairs is one such basic capacity. 
Although the state may not increase its ability to 
structure outcomes by extending control over more 
spheres of social and economic life, it can extend 
its ability to manipulate those resources that are 
available in that sector in accord with state policy. 
Thus, if we understand state power as control 
over resources and not the ability to realize outcomes, 
then state power can be understood as state interven- 
tionism. 
States also vary significantly in this interven- 
tionist capacity. Some states organize medicine, the 
*This analysis with regard the situations of Poland and the 
U.S.S.R. should be referred to the Period between 1986 
and 1989, when this article was originally written. At 
that time in Poland, state intervention on health issues 
was ruled in the same way than other sectors of the 
Polish society by the direct control of a party-state. 
economy and civil society itself, while other states 
mainly provide the legal framework in which others 
organize health care, production and intergroup 
relations. State power as state interventionism thus 
shapes the opportunities for action by other groups, 
including physicians. And certainly it is the state 
which is the most significant organized actor with 
whom physicians deal, whether physicians are 
themselves organized or not. 
We should like to argue that variations in state 
power structure the capacity of physicians to control 
their occupational practice and reproduction, and 
other social institutions which affect physicians’ col- 
lective interest. But another major societal dimension 
also structures the professional power of physicians: 
the organization of civil society itself. 
Frenk and Donabedian recognize the significance 
of civil society’s organization for professional power 
when they introduce the question of its corporate 
organization [2]. But again, it is important that the 
state is missing from their model because the measure 
of state interventionism shapes the capacity for differ- 
ent forms of civil society’s organization. It is not only 
important to consider the organization of civil society 
but also the relationship of the state to civil society 
when assessing professional power. The strength of 
physicians in the U.S.A. is not only contingent on 
their corporate organization, but also on the degree 
of state intervention. This is what most distinguishes 
Sweden from the United States, not the corporate 
organization of civil society. Sweden’s corporate 
organization around labor has significance because it 
has been able to move the state to act on its behalf 
[lo]; physicians’ power in the U.S.A. has declined 
since 1970 partially because those without mon- 
opolies on knowledge or control over capital have 
been able to marshal1 state strength to limit pro- 
fessional power. 
State power is greater when civil society is 
organized by it, rather than when struggles in civil 
society shape state policy. Where the state controls 
the organizations which are normally found in civil 
society, from manufacturing enterprises to trade 
unions and professional associations, we can say the 
state is most powerful, as in state socialist societies. 
Here, then, the power of physicians is moderately 
weak in the U.S.S.R. and Poland not because phys- 
icians are unorganized or because society is not 
organized in a corporate fashion, but because the 
state organizes them both.* 
By introducing this notion of state power to ex- 
plain variations in professional power, we reveal an 
anomaly that is otherwise invisible: the relationship 
between professional power and state power is curvi- 
linear. The U.S.A./Sweden comparison suggests 
declining professional power with increased state 
power, but a comparison of Poland and Mexico 











Fig. 1. Relationship between professional power and state power. 
suggests increasing professional power with increased 
state power (see Fig. 1). 
We should like to argue that differences in pro- 
fessional power are derived not only from the forms 
of organization of civil society per se, nor the general 
image of state strength based on the suppression of 
civil society, but also from the specific strategy fol- 
lowed by the state to deal with civil society. For 
example, in both Poland and Mexico, the state acts 
to organize civil society into its own coopted interest 
groups, but in Mexico, this organization emphasizes 
differentiation, dividing the society in different cor- 
porate sectors (entrepreneurs, peasant workers, state 
workers, and industrial workers). While in Poland 
the strategy followed is homogenization, through the 
direct control of all the sectors of society by the 
party-state.* 
State strategies 
In order to assess the effects of the strategies of the 
state we need a taxonomy of the ways in which the 
state can deal with civil society. Schmitter’s taxon- 
omy of corporatist intermediation is a good point of 
departure [1 I]. He argued that there were two types 
of corporatist intermediation: State corporatism and 
Societal corporatism. 
1. State corporatism is characterized by a dominant 
state that organizes civil society by creating corporate 
bodies that are retained as its auxiliary and dependent 
organs. 
2. By contrast, social corporatism is characterized 
by an autonomous organization of civil society, in 
*The Mexican state has had 60 years of political ‘peace’ 
based on the oganization of the main political sectors in 
the Mexican society in corporate bodies. In this context, 
the Mexican medical profession is not organized cor- 
poratively and the sectors that are so organized, preclude 
its organization. Therefore, the power of the medical 
profession is low in Mexico due to the corporate organ- 
ization of the Mexican society by the state. Whereas in 
the case of Poland, a soviet type state, the control of the 
profession by the state is done through its direct organ- 
ization in state unions ruled by the party-state. 
which there is a balance between the power of the 
state and the civil society. 
One more category should be added to the 
traditional categories of Schmitter to make his 
categories exhaustive. This is the non-corporative 
strategy to deal with civil society. 
3. The non-corporative type may have two forms 
that have in common the lack of important corporate 
bodies in civil society. 
The first form is the characteristic ‘pluralist’ society, 
where there is an autonomous organization of civil 
society but it is constituted by competitive non- 
corporative interest groups. In this, the legitimacy 
and functioning of the state is dependent on multiple 
coalitions of interest groups within a system of 
pluralist representation [12]. Alternatively, there is 
what Jessop calls state centralism, where the civil 
society is organized by the state around a single 
corporate body (i.e. communist party), and the legit- 
imacy and functioning of the state is dependent on 
the same institution. The result of these additions is 
the theoretical framework presented in Table 2. 
The framework depicted here is useful in identify- 
ing a number of relatively stable categories that 
reflect the relationship between professional and state 
power. It also enables us to trace historical move- 
ments across positions that may suggest future possi- 
bilities. 
From the table we can derive two major divisions, 
namely, stable positions and transitional positions. 
STABLE POSlTlONS 
There are four stable positions that correspond 
roughly to the dominant ways in which civil society 
and state relate in contemporary society. These are: 
Pluralism, Social Corporatism, State Corporatism 
and State Centralism. 
Pluralism 
Physicians gained power in the U.S.A. because 
of their ability to organize corporatively while the 
state played a limited role in organizing society and 
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Table 2. Relationships between professional power. state strength and the organization of civil 
societv 
Professional organization 
Civil Society Coroorate Nonsorwrate 
Weak sfafe (minimal intervention into economy and society) 
Non-corporate pluralism 190&1970 U.S.A. (------ 19th century U.S.A. 
Chile after 1973? --_-----) (weak profession) 
(powerful) 
Pre-state corporatism I - - 
Pre-social corporatism I Spain after France’s 









New class power? 
(powerful) 
<I!;----? Poland, U.S.S.R. 
i \ ,,‘I (mod. weak) 
‘i ,I’ I “? 
Spain before 1975 ,“a Mexico 
(weak) <;,i-_-,? (weak profession) I / I I’ ” LX’ i 
Sweden, Chile 1971 - 
(mod power) 
economy. Physicians’ power remains great in com- 
parison to other societies precisely because the state 
stands back, although in the present it appears that 
U.S. physicians are losing power to industrial corpor- 
ations (e.g. hospital chains, health maintenance or- 
ganizations, industry conglomerates, etc.), and other 
interest groups in society [13]. This may be evidence 
of a movement towards a new form of social organ- 
ization. This movement is not represented on the 
table, however, as it does not involve a categorical 
shift in state/society relations. Instead, U.S. evolution 
signifies the intensification of its existing form where 
organizations based primarily on non-capital re- 
sources lose even more ground to those bodies based 
on capital. Professional organizations and trade 
unions both suffer in this transformation. 
This movement is coupled in the health care area 
with an increasingly interventionist state. The 
prospective payment system, for example, is one of 
the biggest regulatory systems ever put in place by the 
state. Physicians might retain some of their pro- 
fessional leverage, however, by forming some kind of 
alliance with corporations,* The interventionist role 
of the U.S. state is still comparatively restricted, 
especially in other areas of the economy. But given 
the pressures derived from the organization of new 
medical interest groups, capital and an increasingly 
interventionist state. U.S. physicians face a likely 
decline in their professional power [2, 12,15-191. 
Social corporatism 
Where there is no ready access to capital, other 
bodies in civil society gain power through the state, 
*It is frequently found in the literature a reference to the 
increasing need of alliances between the physicians and 
administrators to control costs and maintain the quality 
of care in the U.S. [14]. This is an example of the 
recognition of the weakening position of physicians ois 
a uis other groups in American Society. 
at least until the state is already a dominant influence 
in economy and society. If those without independent 
access to capital or state power manage to organize 
themselves independently in civil society, as through 
trade unions, they can gain considerable power and 
offset the corporate organization of professionals 
through society’s influence over the state. Sweden 
represents this possibility, but so would Chile in 1971 
[20,21]. 
Swedish civil society’s corporate organization was 
established through the state’s mediation. This re- 
quired a more interventionist state, but our model 
makes this an historical outcome, not an evolutionary 
one. Although there is a tendency over time, as Frenk 
and Donabedian emphasize, for the state to become 
more interventionist, state power can reorganize itself 
in special historical conjunctures with terrific conse- 
quence for the character of professional power. 
The Thatcher/Reagan privatization scheme 
emerges as one alternative reversing the state inter- 
vention. In that case, Britain could return to the weak 
state model presented above. The case of the Chilean 
society after Pinochet’s coup d’etat, is another 
example of a reversal in state interventionism. 
Although the state certainly increased its coercive 
prerogative, it transformed the national health service 
of Chile into a U.S.-like private health care system in 
a matter of years [21,22]. 
State corporatism 
Once the state does intervene, the range of possi- 
bilities for professional power grows considerably, 
as is presented in Table 2. Where the civil society’s 
autonomy is restricted by the state, both pro- 
fessionals and other social groups have limited possi- 
bilities for power. But the way in which the state 
organizes civil society has great consequences for the 
possibilities for professional power. State organiz- 
ation of civil society is synonymous with cooptation 
of voluntary associations. This occurs both in state 
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socialist societies and in state capitalist societies 
represented by Mexico. Ironically, however, Mexican 
state power is more effective in repressing pro- 
fessional power because while it coopts society, it 
also differentiates it by separating potentially 
dangerous interest groups in different corporations 
(entrepreneurs, peasant workers, state workers, and 
industrial workers), reducing the possibility for the 
solidary organization of society against the state [23]. 
The medical profession in Mexico is weak not only 
because its interests are not represented by a corpor- 
ation, but because the medical profession is inserted 
in different corporate bodies controlled by the state 
that paradoxically preclude the corporative organiz- 
ation of the medical profession [24].* 
State centralism 
As was argued above, the cooptation of voluntary 
associations is a characteristic of state organization of 
civil society. Cooptation also occurs in state centralist 
societies, but in this case cooptation is accompanied 
by homogenization. This is most apparent in socialist 
countries where the authorities coopt different inter- 
est groups into one broad organization (the party) or 
its extensions (official trade unions). Despite the 
appearance of greater state power, this combination 
is- potentially unstable. Recent developments in 
Poland and the Soviet Union suggest that nations in 
this position are likely to move in the direction of 
state corporatism (the Mexican option) [25], or of the 
other two alternative futures suggested by the table: 
(a) increased control by professionals over the state 
resulting in unparalleled class power by professionals 
(a technocracy) [26,27]; or (b) solidary organization 
by civil society against the state, where all sectors of 
society become organized in their struggle against 
state organization of society (societal corporatism). 
It seems much less likely that professionals in these 
countries could move to the new class option pre- 
cisely because they are themselves lacking a common 
class or even professional organization and con- 
sciousness to establish this rule. The Mexican option 
is a considerably more stable form of state domina- 
tion over civil society and professionals in particular, 
given its capacity to fragment professional interests. 
However, the experience of Solidarity in 1980-81 
suggests that the social corporatist option is most 
appealing to ‘society’, as the Solidarity movement 
organized various sectors of the Polish civil society 
against the state [28]. The imposition of martial law 
on 31 December 1981 suggests that a social corpor- 
atism may well be impossible from the authorities’ 
point of view. Even with solidarity’s electoral victory 
in 1989, the compatibility between economic recovery 
and societal corporatism is most uncertain given 
the austerity reconstruction will require. Thus, the 
Mexican option, with even less professional power 
for physicians, may well be the most likely future for 
state centralist societies. These various options are 
depicted in Table 2. 
*Physicians do work and are represented within different 
sectors of the Mexican political system, the labor sector, 
the state bureaucracy sector. and the ministry of health, 
all of them organized in a corporative fashion. 
TRANSITIONAL POSlTlONS 
Transitional positions are those which are unstable 
and contradictory in terms of the expected relation- 
ship between the form of state intervention and the 
organization of civil society. 
For example these positions may be contradictory 
when they present simultaneously retractions of state 
power and of the corporate organization of society, 
which are bound to cotiict and struggle for domi- 
nance. They are transitional since stability cannot 
be achieved unless compatible forms of organization 
of civil society and state strategies are combined, in 
order to balance the power of groups with and 
without monopolies on capital or special knowledge 
and skills. It is our contention that nation states in 
these transitional positions eventually will adopt one 
of the four major stable positions. 
In Spain, for example, the fall of Franc0 caused 
just such a transitional period. In the 1960’s and 
1970’s Spain was the prototype of state corporatism. 
In fact, up to 1975 even though the medical pro- 
fession in Spain was corporatively organized, it was 
as weak and politically dominated as the medical 
profession in Mexico [29]. Clearly, therefore, state 
power is far more important to deciding professional 
power than is the group’s own corporate organiz- 
ation. However, the group organization is very im- 
portant in transition periods. 
After France’s death in 1975, the political system 
in Spain has undergone a number of transformations 
that have led to a pluralistic democratic political 
regime, restricting the state’s power to organize civil 
society. These changes have situated Spain in a 
transitional position that we have called pre-societal 
corporatism. In this new situation the medical pro- 
fession emerged from the dictatorship as a strong 
corporate body and in the first years of democratic 
government the medical profession continuously con- 
fronted the state in its attempt to secure an even more 
powerful position [30]. However, since 1986 the medi- 
cal profession has moved away from confrontational 
policies to a more accomodational strategy, based on 
negotiation with the state. The future of professional 
power in Spain depends very much, however, on the 
way in which the state resumes its intervention, which 
in turn depends on how the rest of civil society 
manages to organize itself. 
This brief summary of the multiple changes in 
Spanish society shows the relevance of the theoretical 
framework in assessing movements and changes in 
state strength, civil society and the organization of 
the medical profession. The Spanish medical pro- 
fession is in a transitional stage precisely because 
Spain itself is undergong a transformation character- 
ized by the return of an autonomous civil society as 
the state has withdrawn [31]. 
EPILOGUE 
By considering both state power and the strategies 
used by the state to control civil society, it is possible 
to differentiate more clearly the historical patterns of 
development of the medical profession in different 
nation states. This is particularly useful to shed light 
on the different levels of power of the medical 
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profession across nations, as well as to illustrate how 
its power depends on the outcome of conflicts and 
struggles between states and societies and among the 
various groups within civil society. 
In a forthcoming paper, we will assess the utility of 
this perspective on the struggle between state power 
and professional power illustrated through a detailed 
comparative historical analysis of the constitution of 
physicians in Mexico and Poland in the twentieth 
century. We will illustrate the common coopting 
mechanisms in Mexico and Poland, the dangers for 
state power of a non-differentiated cooptation in 
Poland and the advantages of this differentiation in 
Mexico. Finally, we will suggest the likely futures of 
professional power in each society. 
In this paper, however, we hope to have suggested 
the utility of thinking about professional power as a 
historical project whose directions depend on the 
relationship between the state and the civil society in 
which physicians act. Although this model was built 
partly on the comparison of Polish and Mexican 
physicians, its heuristic utility ought to extend to 
physicians in the variety of societies found in the 
twentieth century. 
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